Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

Maciej Kalisiak

<mac@dgp.toronto.edu> University of Toronto

Michiel van de Panne

<van@cs.ubc.ca>
University of British Columbia



IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation 2004

Problem & General Idea

problem: user input can lead to failure idea: computer intervenes when necessary

[movie of desired result (4-obstacle example)]

 $\widehat{}$



slide: 1/19

Naïve Implementation

if user's input leads to failure within some given time horizon, override it with a failure-free input





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 2/19

Naïve Implementation: Problem

problem: one can get trapped in a "dead-end"

dead-end > time horizon always possible





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 3/19

Viability Envelope

strategy: mark all such "unavoidable failure" states as "out of bounds", then stay within bounds

- viability envelope = this bound
 - = set of all "points of no return"



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 4/19

Viability Envelope (ctd.)

the envelope is a manifold in the system's state-space
for the simple car, state-space is 3D: (x, y, orientation)

[movie: 3D tumble of 4-obstacle envelope]





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

Applicability

applicable to any dynamical system with known dynamics





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 6/19

- Framework Details -



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 7/19

Single-step Containment

correct the control input when about to cause a breach
disadvantage: harsh and abrupt corrections





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 8/19

Multi-step Containment

use predictive look-ahead, act on breaches earlier
result: milder corrections





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 9/19

Time to Envelope Breach

 $rightarrow T_{eb}(x, u)$: "time to envelope breach"

 \clubsuit how long until control input u causes breach from state x

 \bullet assumption: u is held constant



Time to Envelope Breach

- $rightarrow T_{eb}(x, u)$: "time to envelope breach"
- \clubsuit how long until control input u causes breach from state x
- assumption: u is held constant
- very distant breaches irrelevant
- ◆ clamp T_{eb} at T_h , the "time horizon" (i.e., $T_{eb} \leq T_h$ or $T_{eb} = \infty$)

slide: 10/19

Time to Envelope Breach

- $\bullet T_{eb}(x, u)$: "time to envelope breach"
- \bullet how long until control input u causes breach from state x
- \bullet assumption: u is held constant
- very distant breaches irrelevant
- \bullet clamp T_{eb} at T_{h} , the "time horizon" (i.e., $T_{eb} < T_h$ or $T_{eb} = \infty$)
- "breach-free" implies "... within T_h "



System Meta-states and Control Policy

four meta-states (think: "severity", "DEFCON"):

- ✤ L1: user's control input is breach-free
- L2: L1 false, but a different input is breach-free
- L3: L2 false, but system still within envelope
- L3 false (i.e., containment failed) ♣ 4:

control input actually applied:

- $large L1 \rightarrow$ user's control input
- $2 \rightarrow \text{the breach-free control}$ "closest" to user's
- * L3 \rightarrow the control input with largest T_{eb}^{\dagger} $4 \rightarrow N/A^{\dagger}$

(†: see "least detrimental" control)



- Practical Approximations -



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 12/19

Envelope Approximation

unlikely to have analytic representation
must approximate (from samples, other data)
used: *Nearest Neighbor* machine learning method



Discretization of Control Input

• often need to search or map over the input space, \mathcal{U} (e.g., finding maximal $T_{eb}(x, u)$)

- \bullet intractable if \mathcal{U} is large or continuous
- + instead, work with a discretized subset, $\widehat{\mathcal{U}}$





 $\label{eq:approximate} Approximate \ Safety \ Enforcement \ Using \ Computed \ Viability \ Envelopes$

- Some Results -



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 15/19

Rocket







Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 16/19

Bike







Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 17/19

Future Work

evaluate with more complex systems (higher D)

- multi-dimensional inputs: how to spread corrections across the dimensions?
- incorporate haptics, literally do "pushing the envelope"
- what if only local environment known?



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

Summary & Take-away

- real-time constraint of dynamical system to viable region
- predictive look-ahead using constant inputs
- ✤ T_{eb}, the "time to envelope breach" (clamped to T_h, the "time horizon")
- used to choose among four control policies
- http://www.dgp.toronto.edu/~mac/viab_env



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 19/19



(supplementary material follows)



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 20/19

Grace Period

a method to combat NN surface "noise"

• T_{gr} : max time system is allowed to cross NN envelope before being identified as a "true transition"





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 21/19

Why multi-step leads to milder corrections

more time and space to maneuver

can do no worse: at worst apply the same control signal as with a shorter time horizon





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 22/19

Why the "constant-input" assumption

• in calculating $T_{eb}(x, u)$, need to make assumption about future values of u

for non-constant input signals, no guiding principle to select the "optimal" one

viability theory: generalized inertia principle

* also, user input tends to change slowly, relative to the time scale in question (T_h)

hence assume constant-input



"Least detrimental" emergency control

problem: meta-state L4 can be reached

 due to envelope approximation error
 when all "recovery" trajectories out of an L3 state require non-constant input

* "solution": apply the control which spends least time outside envelope



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

Constructing Envelopes

Nearest Neighbor used to approximate envelope
possible NN sample sources: heuristic, empirical, analytic
other forms can converted to NN samples through queries
also can compute directly from dynamics (slow)



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes



Scalability

- online algorithm: $O(|\widehat{\mathcal{U}}| \cdot T_h)$
- offline algorithm (envelope construction):
 - If we show the state-space dimensionality of NN samples for equivalent-quality envelope tends to grow exponentially with state-space dimensionality
 - envelope geometry tends to be simple, relative to # of dimensions
 - perhaps other learning methods can give better scalability (SVM?)









Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 27/19

Leftovers



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 28/19

Motivation (short)

- problem: direct human control of dynamical systems is often difficult, prone to error and failure (e.g., control-by-wire of a bike)
- particularly difficult for users unfamiliar with system
- idea: computer aids the user by keeping system controllable
- motivation: "pushing the envelope" metaphor



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 29/19

Overview

Framework

- taxonomy of state-space
- containment strategy
- * T_{eb} , system meta-states, and control policy



Overview

Framework

- taxonomy of state-space
- containment strategy
- * T_{eb} , system meta-states, and control policy

Practical approximations

approximating envelopes with Nearest Neighbor
discretization of control input

slide: 30/19

Overview

Framework

- taxonomy of state-space
- containment strategy
- * T_{eb} , system meta-states, and control policy

Practical approximations

approximating envelopes with Nearest Neighbor
discretization of control input

Some results



Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 30/19

Taxonomy of State-space

• a landing rocket with bounded thrust (z = altitude)





Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 31/19









Approximate Safety Enforcement Using Computed Viability Envelopes

slide: 32/19